

Swiss Confederation

The Swiss Debt Brake – Experiences since 2003

Conference "Perspectives of the Fiscal Policy in Latvia and the EU" – June 6, 2013

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
Structure of the presentation

- Background of the Swiss debt brake
- How it works
- Track record
- Current problems
- Conclusions




Switzerland's real estate crisis of the 1990s


Real estate price indices 1980=100




Growth difference CHE vs EU-15



Jobless rate




Public Deficit in percent of GDP






A decade of debt

Federal government gross debt



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Swiss debt brake: concept






Main elements of the debt brake

- Expenditure ceiling: revenues multiplied with business cycle adjustment factor (k = trend GDP / real GDP)
- Compensation account: Record of past structural deficits and surpluses
- Amortization account: Record of extraordinary receipt and expenditure. (Exemption: earmarked revenues and corresponding expenditures)




Debt brake extension mechanism






Track record (I)

Federal government structural deficits / surpluses









Track record (III)

Financial Statements 2012

CHF mn	Fin. stmt.	Fin. stmt.	Fin. stmt.	Fin. stmt.	Fin. stmt.
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Ordinary fiscal balance	7 297	2 721	3 568	1 912	1 262
Cyclical	1 086	-1 097	-817	-450	-756
Structural	6 210	3 818	4 384	2 362	2 018
Compensation account credit Compensation account balance Amortization account credit Amortization account balance	6 210	3 818	3 969	2 197	1 583
	8 827	12 645	15 614	17 811	19 394
	–	–	416	-1 542	1 173
	–	–	416	-1 127	46



Current problems

Estimation of receipts

Criticized bias towards underestimation (!)

Political pressure

- Compensation account (asymmetric management)
- Credit rests
- Bypassing the debt brake



Conclusions: Experiences and limitations

Positive experience so far

- Introduced top-down approach into fiscal policy, which facilitates budget process
- Rule-based fiscal policy strengthens fiscal responsibility within coalition government and within parliament
- Forces rapid reaction to changing budgetary situations

However no panacea

- Problems of budget quality remain in the responsibility of the political system
- Focus of debt brake is short term: no direct incentive to tackle long-term challenges